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A REVIEW OF LEGAL REALISM
WALTER B. KENNEDYt
"The waters of the law are unwontcdly alive. New winds are blowing
on old doctrines, the critical spirit infiltrates traditional formulas, philo-
sophic inquiry is pursued without apology as it becomes clearer that deci-
sions are functions of some juristic philosophy."1
So wrote Professor Felix Frankfurter in 1931 and his figurative ap-
praisal of juristic weather in terms of agitated water and whirling
wind accurately pictured the jurisprudential flux of a decade ago. If it
is permissible to continue the learned jurist's appraisal of law in symbolic
terms, we may observe that the jural barometer has since registered all
degrees of atmospheric disturbance--from soothing zephyr to howling
hurricane-from temperate legal reforms to frigid farewells to all law.
Yes, there is action aplenty in the legal order and we meet to attempt
to catch the temper and tempo of the times. Certain it is that jurispru-
dence has taken on new life and healthy vigor; has deigned to descend
to earth and to walk and talk with the common man; and is even en-
veloped in a new literary dress, shaking off the heavy paragraphs and
somber sentences of older jurisprudence. We occasionally detect a flash
of humor or touch of irony as our modernists pierce an opponent's thesis
with a pungent pen, or execute an adversary legalistically in a painless,
even pleasurable, manner.
I speak briefly of form before substance because I hold with the
scholarly Cardozo that form and substance of jurisprudence are closely
interlocked. "They are tokens of the thing's identity. They make it
what it is." 2 One misses the depth of modern juristic revolt if one fails
to note the realistic form, the language of the laboratory, the efferves-
cence of youth and the skeptical tone which characterize current legal
literature.
In the juridical processes of the Canon Law, since the 16th century,
there exists an official known as the Advocatus Diaboli whose chief func-
tion is to interpose all possible objections, weighty or slight, against the
pending petition of canonization or beatification.8 I suspect that my
friends of the functional persuasion will see more than a fleeting resem-
blance to the Devil's Advocate in my presence on the program today.
t Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
Address, revised 'for publication, delivered at the Section on Jurisprudence, Eighth
American Scientific Congress, Washington, D. C., May 17, 1940.
1. Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes, Jr. (1931) 44 Haiv. L. Rav. 717.
2. CARDOZO, LAW AND LrrT.ERAxu (1930) 6.
3. Advocaturs Diaboli, 1 CATrouic ENcYc. (1907) 168.
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But I know that their antagonism will be somewhat lessened when I
recall that the seemingly paradoxical title of the Devil's Advocate in
ecclesiastical law is Promoter of the Faith. The paradox, of course,
fades away when one realizes that the diabolical attack is meticulously
framed solely in the interest and honor of the Church lest one be beatified
without juridical proof of sanctity.
It is in this spirit that we propose to examine the tenets of Legal
Realism. We are met today for one purpose and in a common cause-
to endeavor to bring about a better and nobler body of Jurisprudence.
Labels of Realism or Conceptualism, Functionalism or Scholasticism, are
but tags and tickets which mark representatives of the warring schools,
but there is no warfare penetrating enough to destroy our faith in and
allegiance to the Lady of the Law. Our joint contributions concern
movements and not men, programs and not personalities. As a token
of this spirit of cooperation, I accept without qualification the finely
phrased words of a realist in his current attempt to restate the realist
position: We are all "searching for the true issues and the true guiding
principles" 4 of law; all else becomes secondary and unimportant.
While my remarks will be generally critical, but I hope constructive,
this will be because, like the Devil's Advocate, my search is for the flaws
in the mosaic and patterns of present-day Realism. But let me make my
position clear. I do not deny that Realism has made many worthwhile
contributions to the science of law. Concededly, it has a place in the
legal order provided that it keeps its place.
"The most distinctive product of the last decade in the field of juris-
prudence is the rise of a group of scholars styling themselves realists
and content with nothing less than revision to its very roots of the
method of judicial decision which is part of the classical tradition."35
Predominantly American in its origin and personnel,( possessed of
brilliant writers and able advocates, it stands forth as our most active
school of jurisprudence. Despite a decade of vigorous and spectacular
pamphleteering and oral attacks upon the traditional law, Realism has
not captured the fancy or aroused the sustained interest of the Bench
and Bar. Pronouncements that "the age of the classical jurist is over"7
or that "the experimental attitude [of Realism] has spread everywhere" 3
4. LlewellM, On Reading and Using the New Jurisprudence (1940) 26 A.B.A.J. 301.
5. Cardozo, Address Before New York State Bar Association, 55 Rro.rs or Nrw YonnX
STATE BAR Ass'.. (1932) 264.
6. TiAsEF, AT Lmomoucno; TO TE SocoLocY or LxTwv (1940) 58-59.
7. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 CoL. L.
Rxv. 833.
8. Frank, Realism in Jurisprudence (1934) 7 Am.. L. ScHoL REv. 1056.
19401
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
are somewhat premature in tense; they may be promissory of the
future; they do not record accurately the events of the present or past.
Why has Realism failed to catch hold? One defender of the New
Jurisprudence answers: "Our thinking is tradition-bound; our thoughts
pace within the walls of a prison."0  True, unquestionably true, but
certainly not the only explanation of the halting progress of a juris-
prudential movement vibrant with the fighting faith and verve of Youth
on the march.
Running through the pages of realist literature is the unrelenting
insistence that traditional law fails because it is unwilling or unable
to look at itself from the outside, to submit to the observational and
diagnostic techniques of the scientist."0 May it not be in order to sug-
gest that the time is ripe for a similar objective and observational analysis
of Realism "from the outside"? It may well be that Realists, immersed
in the ruthless pursuit of facts and the grim realities of life, are too
close to their favored philosophy to observe its defects in operation.
I propose to consider four fundamental failures of Realism which are
closely interlocked and spell out possible reasons for the slowing down
of the realist machine. These defects are:
(1) Lack of consistent application of the scientific approach in its
criticism of traditional law.
(2) Overemphasis upon fact-finding and consequent submersion of
principles and rules.
(3) Absence of skepticism regarding the hypothetical theories of the
social sciences.
(4) The creation of a new form of word magic and verbal gymnastics.
My first question is: Is Realism really scientific? The query is a
timely one in a Congress which meets to pay tribute to the men and
women of science. I am sure that my realist friends will not object
when I invoke here and in later sections of my paper the words of the
venerable Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, father of real realism, who
gave purpose and direction to their philosophy. Writing under the
pertinent title of "Law in Science and Science in Law," Justice Holmes
says: "The man of science in the law is not merely a bookworm. To
a miscroscopic eye for detail he must unite an insight which tells him
what details are significant. Not every maker of exact investigation
counts, but only he who directs his investigation to a crucial point.""
Surely in a philosophy of law that makes science the core of its focal at-
9. Harno, Ideas and the Law (1940) 26 A.B.A.J. 651.
10. ROBINSON, LAW AND THE LAWYERS (1934) 62.
11. HOLmES, COLLECrED LEGAL PAPERs (1920) 224. Italics inserted.
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tack against the common law, we may expect to find "exact investiga-
tion" directed to a crucial point. But reformers, who pride themselves
on their skepticism regarding classical law, exhibit an amazing faith
in unscientific and experimental hypotheses which are still being gravely
debated and seriously doubted by skilled scientists in their respective
disciplines.
Realism frequently discloses an unscientific attitude before it even
enters the Halls of Science. Realists demand the integration of social
and economic facts into the legal order-the infiltration of psychology,
economics, sociology, anthropology and all other natural and social
sciences. Mark you, we are not now concerned with the value of such
extra-legal data but merely with the method of acquiring such informa-
tion and doing it in a satisfactory and scientific manner. What degree
of skill and proficiency does the legal realist demand in order to use
such non-legal material intelligently and wisely in the improvement of
legal rules and principles? One prominent realist suggests that modest
mastery suffices, mastery sufficient to read critically, and to evaluate
the findings read and the methods out of which they came.12  But the
proposal to widen the frontiers of the law by a leisurely excursion into
the realms of adjoining fields demands some consideration. It has been
wisely said that "as the diameter of our knowledge increases, so also
does the circumference of our ignorance." And the circumference of
our ignorance does not decrease with a "modest mastery" of many
disciplines.
Let us consider some of the results of the superficial examination of
scientific theories without the critical analysis or skeptical approach
which Justice Holmes marks out for "every maker of exact investiga-
tion." The danger is that the "lump concepts" of traditional law, con-
cededly in need of revaluation, may be displaced by an unscientific
assortment of "lump facts." By "lump facts" I mean a conglomerate
pile of so-called scientific data, statistics and theories (frequently un-
tested and unverified) collected second-hand from the social sciences,
welded into a loose generalization and offered under the label of science
to contest the validity or utility of a legal formula or doctrine.13  We
submit that traditional legal doctrine is entitled to a day in court before
eviction; and that the evidence tendered must satisfy the burden of
proof that it is both scientific and factual.
Lack of time forbids more than a dogmatic listing of some of the
variant evidences of the unscientific approach. I have in mind the full
12. Llewelyn, On What Is Wrong With Legal Education (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV. 671.
13. Kennedy, Realism, Wrhat Next? (1939) 8 Fomrm. L. Rsv. 73-75.
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sweep of realistic probing beneath the surface of judicial minds into
the dark alleys of subconscious behavior; 4 the complete dismissal of
formal judicial opinions with the flourish of a pen;", the confident use
of economic determinism to explain one hundred year old opinions;
the gastronomical approach which urges the advocate to take a sly
glance at the judge's breakfast menu;'" the distortion of judicial deci-
sions by the use of economic statistics which would not be accepted by a
single economist or statistician;' 7 and the easy shift from the assump-
tions of Freudian psychoanalysis or Watson's behaviorism to an authori-
tarian attack upon the certainty of law. True indeed, in the words
of Justice Cardozo, "the process of psychoanalysis has spread to un-
accustomed fields."' 8
Note again: I am not at all concerned at the moment with the values
of extra-legal data when scientifically examined and collated. My point
is made if I convince you that the realistic approach in the stated situ-
ations is not the scientific method; and that Realism, which worships
at the altar of Scientism, has departed from the basic, essential practices
of true scientific research.
Closely related to the first contention is the belief that our realist
reformers have overemphasized fact-finding as a method of attacking
classical law. Realists say that they "want to check ideas, and rules,
and formulas by facts, to keep them close to facts."' 9  A very com-
14. Kennedy, A Required Course on Jurisprudence (1940) 9 Am. L. SciooL Rsv. 593.
See also my forthcoming paper, Psychologism in the Law, to appear in the GEo. L.J.,
November 1940.
15. For example, see Nelles, Commonwealth v. Hunt (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rav. 1151.
Cf. Pound, Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts (1940) 53 ILHAv. L. Rzv. 365.
16. Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 305.
Llewellyn does not claim that the inquiry into the "state of the judge's digestion" is very
apt to be fruitful largely because it is difficult to "find adequate evidence to justify at-
tributing any particular decision to any such factor." (Id. at 306 n.) He insists, how-
ever, that the task of the counselor is to guard against such possible factor.
The critic of Realism is not convinced that the item of the "state of the judge's digestion"
is important even if the abdominal distress is known by both advocates participating In the
trial of the case. So far as I am aware, realists have not indicated just how this juristic
diagnosis is to be handled in the subsequent conduct of the case at bar. Concededly the
attorneys will proceed sympathetically and tenderly with the trial in order not to irritate
the court. "A soft answer in such a situation is always effective." SHnxaTAo, TRIAL OF A
Jua" AcrioN IN Naw YoRK (1938) 37. But surely Realism must offer more than common
sense conduct in this situation. What effect will this gastronomical disturbance have upon
the manner of presentation of evidence or the form of the brief?
17. Kennedy, Realism, What Next? (1939) 8 FoRmxn. L. REV. 45, 58-71.
18. Cardozo, J., dissenting opinion in United States v. Considine, 296 U. S. 287, 299
(1935).
19. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 HARv. L. Ray. 122, 123.
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mendable objective. But out of this laudable program is emerging a
fact-fetish that tends to make facts alone important. Ideas and rules
are not being rechecked; they are virtually submerged in a welter of
finely spun distinctions of facts. Facts and functions are key words to
unlock the real law. What utility remains in legal rules and formulas
when we are advised by a distinguished scholar that the judges' "real
reasons are locked within their own minds---or within judicial council
chambers--even if they are known to themselves. Their good reasons-
or at least the best they can command for the occasion-are displayed
in the reports."2 How much value should be given to judicial prece-
dents when a learned dean advises us that "an opinion is but the smoke
which indicates the grade of mental explosive employed." 2' Our con-
stant fear is that the same legalistic smoke may blur the clear-visioned
fact analysis of our functional friends. But more about optical impedi-
ments in a moment.
It does not suffice to recall that Justice Holmes once said, "We need
to think things and not words." Let it also be remembered that he
held that "One mark of a great lawyer is that he sees the application of
broadest rules."2' You may recall his amusing story about the Vermont
Justice of the Peace who was asked to adjudicate the issue arising be-
tween two farmers regarding the alleged destruction of a butter chum.
In the words of Justice Holmes: "The Justice (of the Peace) took time
to consider and then said that he had looked through the statutes and
could find nothing about churns, and gave judgment for the defendant."23
But we need not go to the verdant hills of Vermont for examples of
the current overinflation of fact-finding. One ambitious young lawyer
in my own state recently reduced the New York law of torts to homeo-
pathic factual capsules so that by the use of his alphabetically arranged
treatise a lawyer, facing the vexatious question, let us say, of legal lia-
bility for an injury traceable to a defective door, may find the pertinent
law neatly packaged under the subdivisions, "swinging doors, revolving
doors and slamming doors." -" Let us beware lest we supplant the "hair-
splitting machine of logic" with a fact-splitting device which is infinitely
worse. Now do not misunderstand me. I am not quarreling with the
use of descriptive word indices, but I say that they are at best approaches
to the law and not the law itself." If time permitted, I think we could
20. Hamilton, The Living Law (1937) 26 SuTavy Gnrmunc 632. Italics iw=rtcd.
21. GnR-, JuDE AzD JuRy (1930) 53.
22. Ho. as, COLnWm L= PA Pms, supra note 11.
23. Ibid.
24. JA cOBS, NEw YORK, LAW or AccmLnzrs (1934) 574-57S.
25. Kennedy, Book Review, N.Y. L.J., April 27, 1934.
19401
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
dissect some of our more extreme types of functional case books and
prove that they are not functioning.2 I recall the critical words of
John Chipman Gray at Harvard Law School thirty years ago when
he dismissed abruptly the inutility of what he called "plumbers' juris-
prudence." There is some warrant, I fear, even today for Professor
Gray's curt dismissal of the advantages of appending realistic adjectives
to the law.
2 7
Lest it be thought that I am erecting a juristic straw man overstuffed
for the occasion, may I recall that we have eminent scholars of the func-
tional persuasion who are content with nothing less than the wholesale
ouster of such legal concepts as Corporation, Property and Title because,
they argue, conceptual thinking blurs our pursuit of the all important
economic and social facts.2 Others argue that opportunism and com-
promise, pragmatically tested in terms of facts alone, should be, and
frequently are, the real guiding forces of judicial decisions.2"
Concluding the second point, it seems to be clear that the defect
of fact fetish is not necessarily permanent or basically inherent in the
realist formula. Let fact-finding go forward without limit, but let us
realize that the utterance of a catchword, whether it be "fact-finding"
or "scientific approach", is not a solving word in itself." Even science
has its comptometers to count the units of machine-made goods moving
from automatic assembly lines. Is it unscientific to suggest that the
task of the legal scholar is not complete with the piling up of facts? He
must have a weighing machine with which to evaluate such definitely
found facts."
We need not peer into the future, however immediate, to witness the
devastating effects of surrealism running riot in the fine arts. Even the
naturalist school of jurisprudence must stand aghast at some of the
verbal and pictorial contortions passing current under the title of sur-
realism in art, literature and the drama. 2 Excesses are actually abroad
26. It has been said that the factual classification of a functional case book brings
to mind once more Justice Holmes' story about the Vermont Justice of the Peace (note
23 supra). Gregory, Book Review (1940) 34 YALE L. J. 632, 634.
27. For a streamlined and modernistic advocacy of a new form of "plumber's jurispru-
dence" see RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS (1939) ch. XI.
28. Cohen, supra note 7, at 820-821.
29. ARNOLD, FOLKLORE OF CAPITALisM7 (1937).
30. Kennedy, Principles or Facts? (1935) 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 53.
31. Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student (1934) 7 Am. L. ScnooL Rv.
1051, 1065.
32. "Never in the history of civilized art has humanity cut so poor a figure. Whatever
is base, whatever is open to derision, whatever is ugly in human existence, is made a
major theme not only by the most significant fiction of our time, but by its art as well.
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today in adjacent cultures which undermine reason and offer intellectual
nightmares as the true inspirational sources of esthetic beauty. I know
that I voice the judgment of every jurisprudential scholar-regardless
of his legal philosophy-when I say that we want no such surrealism
in the law. Nevertheless it must be regretfully stated that the outriders
of Legal Realism, with their emphasis upon sub-vocal behavior, emo-
tional explosions of the judiciary, and the curt dismissal of the "thinking
man", are fostering a movement somewhat similar to the "monotonous
pessimism of contemporary art."
There are two particular trends of modern realism which deserve
special treatment, namely, Psychologism and Semanticism. The trends
in question are admittedly inclinations or tendencies-mental pathways
sufficiently grooved to be discernible and yet not marked with the same
exact metes and bounds which define the thoughtways of traditional law.
By psychologism I mean much more than a particular type of psycho-
logical theory. Under the catch-all title we include the current tenden-
cies to account for judicial decisions, wholly or in part, in terms of
personal impulses, economic factors, hunches, or institutional compul-
sives; and in corresponding degree to dismiss or minimize the authority
of law, the exercise of reason and the impartiality of the judicial process.
Ample authority exists for the statement that realists accept in sub-
stantial degree the utility of modern psychology and economics as posi-
tive sciences which offer substantial aid and assistance to the distressed
Lady of the Law.' Not alone have modern realists endorsed the value
of current psychological theories, but they have accorded one brand of
psychology a dominant place in their program of juristic reform. The
pages of legal literature disclose a surprisingly generous acceptance of
a mechanistic psychology which tends to minimize intellect as the gov-
erning agency in the fabrication of judicial opinions, unseats reason and
substitutes a train of such terms as "behavior" and "personal impulses"
as descriptive of the ways of judicial thinking. For example, we read
that "every (judicial) opinion necessarily is the justification of the
personal impulses of the judge"; 4 and that "man's conduct is shaped
by factors which are not within his control." 5 Each succeeding phase
Portraits without personality, amorphous figures that are the drab accessories of city or
country slums, men and women painted or carved to represent the mere unthinking
creatures of circumstance-these are the renderings of humanity by the monotonous
pessimism of contemporary art.' Address by Dr. Charles R. Morey, Afarquand Professor
of Art, University of Pennsylvania, New York Herald Tribww, Sept. 17, 1940.
33. See note 14 supra.
34. Shroeder, Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions (1917) 6 C=r. L. REV. 89, 93.
35. Swetlow, Anti-Social Behavior and the MAWaghten Rule (1938) 72 U. S. L. rxv. 632.
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of realism tends to show that there is more than rhetoric in the state-
ment that their favored psychologism leans toward a tropism-technique
in evaluating judicial conduct.
Time forbids more than an abrupt summary of so-called psychologism
in action. Evidence is at hand to prove that realists are beginning to in-
voke the aid of pseudo-psychologism in the interpretation of judicial
opinions. One form of psychologism is appearing wherein the judges
are confidentially informed that external stimuli control their decisions
even when they are not aware of these sub-vocal factors." Judges are
acting behaviorwise even when they do not say so; they are doing the
right thing a lot of times when they are not saying the right words.
Under this system it is possible for the juristic surgeon to probe beneath
the surface of any judicial opinion and to pull forth latent reasons for
the decision.3 T The unfortunate and unscientific consequence of such
procedure is that anyone else, gifted with a lively imagination, can ex-
tract from the same opinion absolutely variant and antagonistic
inferences.
I submit that this entire process is endangered by a superabundance
of "wishful thinking" which lacks substantially any degree of certainty
or scientific conclusion. Time marches on and we speak only of the
present. Today it appears that one of the many drawbacks of sur-
realism in jurisprudence is that it is burdened with a heavy load when
it selects and endorses psychologism as its favorite Ism in the study
and evaluation of judicial opinions; and tries to apply its confusing
formulas in the solution of concrete legal problems.
One of the latest excrescences of Legal Realism is the renewed em-
phasis upon the science of semantics, the study of the meaning of words.
There is warrant for an attack against inexact terminology and the
slippery meaning of words and I do not mean to intimate in any way
that semantic research is objectionable in itself. Concededly it is a
laudable study and is particularly profitable in the legal order.
But I propose to examine just two phases of current semanticism
which tie up definitely with the foregoing critique of Legal Realism
and indicate that streamlined semantic reform has been carried too far.
What does Realism propose by way of reformation of language, par-
ticularly legal language? One realist says: "When law deals with words,
(realists) want words to represent tangibles which can be got at beneath
36. Yntema, The Horn Book Method and the Conflict of Laws (1928) 37 YALE L. J.
468; Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis (1928) 14 A.B.A.J. 159; Moore, Legal and
Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting of Direct Discounts (1931) 40 YALE L. 3. 1219.
37. See note 15 supra.
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words and observable relations between these tangibles." s Realists are
insisting that "things are the sons of heaven, but words are the daughters
of men.""3 Give us concrete things, things that we can see and grapple
withl All abstractions, symbols and concepts are taboo and should
be replaced by "it-words." Another devotee of word surgery proposes
in effect that we eliminate all words without a tangible external referent
and argues that scientists alone are equipped with a vocabulary which
meets with his approval.40 We do not pause to criticize, but merely
to observe that the full sweep of semantic revision removes practically
every legal concept of the common law-Trusts, Contract, Torts, Cor-
poration, Property-for not one of these familiar abstractions possesses
a definite, concrete, tangible referent. Likewise, it may be noted that
the same "thingifying" of non-legal terminology would reduce Webster's
dictionary to the proportions of a pocket notebook.
One final observation may be made regarding the breadth of attack
upon legal and non-legal terminology. Delete from our language all
words without definite referents of tangible character and our modem
semanticists could hardly frame a sentence without violating their own
rule.4 I wonder if they realize that in framing their broad critique
against abstractions, they have merely substituted abstractions of their
own making. Restating the familiar words of Holmes: "It is not the
first use but the tiresome repetition of inadequate catchwords which I
am observing."' Are we not somewhat surfeited with such hackneyed
words in the new'semantic vocabulary as "behavior", "background"
and "function." Background has been so frequently used that we are
beginning to lose sight of the fact that legal problems involve fore-
ground as well. Every opinion, even every act, of the judiciary is ex-
plained in terms of judicial "behavior." A count of one law review
article disclosed that the writer used the favorite word "function" over
sixty times.43 Applying the test of modern semanticism, I ask: What
is the tangible referent of "behavior", "background" or "function"?
These stated defects of unscientific approach, excessive emphasis upon
fact-finding, glorification of the experimental hypotheses of science and a
38. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism (1931) 44 H.nv. L. REv. 1222, 1223.
39. Johnson, Preface to the English Dictionary, reprinted in (199) 39 nIYvA=D
CLassics 191.
40. C;AsE, TYvANY oF WoRDs (1933).
4L It is submitted that Stuart ChaEe, who starts out to deflate the airy words of our
language which have no definite referent, violated his own formula in framing the very
title of his book, Tyranny of Words. Iyranny, the key-word of his title, has no referent;
the name refers to numberless types of tyranny or oppression, political, social, racial, etc.
42. B=2r, Jusnicn OLrvER WE DELL Horzms (1923) 197-203.
43. Cohen, supra note 7.
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new form of word-jugglery may be traceable in part to the exuberance
of a new movement driving forward with the laudable enthusiasm of
youth. But the anchor of age and experience-and the nature and the
power of man to reason and to think and to idealize-must not be lost
in the dizzy speed which characterizes modern life. Nor is the critic
quite content with the conciliatory explanation that the current over-
emphasis upon behavior, opportunism and sheer power is merely a
temporary excess; the adherent to the traditional common law believes
that a legal philosophy which begins in doubt and ends in despair 44 is
not merely overdone; it needs to be done over.
There are optimistic grounds for the belief that Realism is being done
over. Observe the current appraisal of the "New Jurisprudence" by
a leading realist who pays tribute to the importance of idealism, natural
law, zeal for justice and the necessity for a fixed goal to be consciously
sought by all; 45 the disappearance of the blue prints of "social engineer-
ing" with nimble cogs and wheels but with no place in its machinery
for the rationality and faith of mankind; the abandonment by legal
realists in practice of their written proclamations that law is a series
of symbols and myths and that the law is basically uncertain now and
forever.
But more pertinent than any of these facial evidences of a conciliatory
spirit among the adherents to the various kinds of realistic philosophy
is the unanimous rebuke presently directed against the advocates of
surrealism who propose not revision of the classical law to the roots, but
rather the uprooting of all law.46 Building ruthlessly but logically upon
the skepticism and pessimism of earlier writers, they propose not radical
legal reform but the complete ouster of all law. To the credit of mod-
erate realists, let it be clearly stated that they have joined anti-realists
in the vigorous dissent.
Surrealism is the pendulum-swing of antagonism to law reaching the
zenith point. Here is the culmination of psychological skepticism and
economic determinism. Here at long last is the American pattern of
the European philosophies of "no law."
44. It is interesting to observe the mounting evidence that Realism, beginning in doubt
and skepticism regarding traditional law, is now reaching the stage of absolute despair
regarding the utility of a legal order. Kennedy, supra note 14.
45. Llewellyn, supra note 4.
46. The general condemnation of RODLL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS (1939) is sig-
nificant. See the adverse book reviews in Book Notes (1939) 53 HARv. L. Rv. 363;
Book Review (1940) 74 N.Y. L. R. 48; Book Review (1940) 25 WASU. U. L. Q. 296;
Radin, Woe Unto You, Lawyers-A Book Review (1940) 38 Micu. L. Rrv. 504; Llewellyn,
supra note 4, at 425.
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Thus the peak of a give-it-all-up philosophy of law has been reached.
Out of the commendable beginning of realism with its objective of true
scientific research came forth increasing doubt as to the utility of a rule
by law, now terminating in absolute despair of a juristic order. The one
ingredient which we need today and, I believe and hope, we are re-
capturing is the discovery of the futility of completely separating the
law "as is" from the law "as it ought to be."'  The fatal divorce of the
actual from the ideal or the real from the abstract is a penetrating
defect of realism which has ended in this unqualified rejection of rule
by law. On this issue the coalition party of anti-realism stands united,
and indeed has received considerable support from the conservative
members of the realist group. Composed of many factions, not always
in agreement on other jurisprudential problems, it is evident today that
a mighty force is ready to oppose any legal philosophy which localizes
law in a behavior-bound court or seeks for explanations of judicial
opinions in unreliable economic or psychological theory, or in its
more extreme forms explains law as "will) 4s or "force"9--or racial
supremacy.10
But I would not conclude this paper with a prophecy of gloom and
disaster. These extreme and somewhat fantastic definitions of law may
be visible in the world about but they do not typify juristic thought in
the Americas. Through the smoke screen of world war and the intellec-
tual fog there gleams forth the beacon light of idealism; the belief in
the courage of man to think through his problems to a definite goal;
the imperishable concept of justice which is the six-century heritage of
the common law.
47. Found, The Church in Legal History (1939) Juarnr LAw LcTRuS 1-97; Fuux,
LAW z; QUEsT or IzsEsm (1940); BonraUaMrMn=, JumsPRUDmCE (1940) cl. IMV.
43. "Also in the United States the realist and on, the Continent a type of nationalist
consider the idea of a state ruling according to law and not according to vill as sup r-
stitious or as decadent. They scoff at the idea of a people solemnly covenanting by con-
stitution or bill of rights to hew to announced principles of right and justice and to reason,
and striving by continued adherence to judicial construction of their covenant to mae
it real in their political behavior." PoUat, Tim Fu-uRE or am Co-o.:: Lw
(1937) 19-20.
49. ".... what we call law is actually a system of rules about force to be used by the
members of an organization, the organization in question, the state, having achieved a
practical monopoly of force within a certain territory." OaCvaox-A, Lve As FAcr (1933)
193. Radin, Book Review (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 507; Kocourek, Book Review (1940)
34 i . L. REv. 637.
50. "Law is what Aryan men consider as law; non-law is what they reject?" Alfred
Rosenberg, Das Recht wurzelt im IValk (1937) 4 Zsmscnmmn Dr Ai=Da--= run DW-rsosi
Rrcirr 610 cited in BoDnraEnme, JUnISPRUaDMXe (1940) 240n.




Empirical operations alone cannot solve our legal problems even in
an age which has lifted man to the sky and hurled his voice around the
world with the turn of a knob. Science, wond'rous and miraculous in its
inventions, teaches a lesson to us in the law. While Science gave man
the mechanism which permits him to ride the air, Science also wisely
equipped the instrument board of the airplane with altitudinal and
direction devices as well as with a speedometer. To reach our destina-
tion, height and direction are as important as speed lest, Corrigan-like,
we find ourselves progressing backwards. The law may well borrow
the apt scientific terms "vector" and "scalar" from the vocabulary of
Science. Today, more than ever before, we need "vector" minds as well
as "scalar" minds in the law-minds which sense the fact that true
progress requires a consideration of plan and purpose as well as dis-
tance and speed." Radio waves, vagrant and unconfined, spell confusion
and chaos; they must be channeled and grooved to serve the cause of
communication among men. So also with the law. It does not suffice
in this world of change and experiment to announce, "we are on our
way." A jural radio beam may give timely answer to the pertinent and
ever present query: What goal are we seeking in jurisprudence today?
We believe that despite the frailties of humankind, despite the collapse
of rule by law in the world about, we can and will find justice under law
in the Americas today.
51. Dickinson, Legal Change and The Rule of Law (1940) 44 DicxwsoN L. Rev. 149.
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